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This paper attempts to estimate the Mincerian earnmgs function for Eritrea by 
employing Eritrean Household Income and Expenditure Survey (EHIES) 96/97 data. 
The Mincerian earnings function is estimated by using OLS and Heckman two-stage 
econometric techniques. The latter was found to be plausible because it avoids 
selectivity bias. The list of potential determinants of earnings is broadened to include 
education, potential experience, occupation, gender, the pre-independence history of 
workers and region. On average, the rate of return to education increases with 
increased years of schooling. The highest rate of return is found for a technical school 
or university diploma, followed respectively by a university degree, secondary, 
middle and elementary schooling. Females enjoy a higher rate of return to education 
than males. The rate of return to education differs substantially between private and 
public sector employment. Ex-fighters enjoy some form of special wage premium in 
view of the importance of their pre-independence history and this party premium is 
substantially higher in the public sector than in the private sector. There is also a peak 
level of experience that positively affects earnings. The effect of experience on 
earnings is greater in the private sector than in the public sector. Occupational choice 
is one of the determinants of earnings in Eritrea; however, not all occupational groups 











1. Introduction l 
Eritrea is situated in the hom of Africa, with the Red Sea on its east coast, the Sudan 
to the west and north, Ethiopia to the south and Djibouti at its extreme southern tip. Its 
geographic area covers approximately 125, 000 square kilometres (about the size of 
the Western Cape, South Africa). Although there is no exact estimate of Eritrea's 
population size, it is reported to be between 3- 3.5 million with hundreds of thousands 
residing in exile mainly in the Sudan (World Bank, 2002). Eritrea used to have a 
relatively advanced and competitive industrial sector in the 1950s. The 30-year war of 
independence with Ethiopia, destructive policies of the colonial Ethiopian regimes, 
successive droughts and the recent war with Ethiopia have however severely damaged 
the economy. 
Eritrea was liberated in May 1991 after 30 years of war. After a democratic 
referendum under United Nations (UN) supervision in May 1993, Eritrea became an 
independent state and joined the UN. In 1991, the liberated Eritrea was characterized 
by a ruined infrastructure, feeble institutions, and non-dynamic and technologically 
backward sectors (IMF, 1998: 4). These decades of lost opportunities for growth and 
development have made Eritrea's post-liberation endeavour for development very 
difficult. In 2001 the per capita income was reported to be USD 200 with a GDP of 
USD 690 million (World Bank, 2002). 
To realise their ambition of nationalism, Eritreans commenced re-building 
their nation in 1991 with the limited resources available to them. The philosophy of 
the government was self-reliance, which mainly entailed a high dependence on the 
mobilization of domestic resources. As the private sector was non-existent and market 
forces were inadequate to allocate resources efficiently, the government had to playa 
key role in the economy. The Provisional Government of Eritrea (PGE) accordingly 
articulated in its intent of policy that the macroeconomic objectives were, among 
others, to promote an outward oriented, private sector led market economy (Macro 
Policy, 1994). Foremost among these objectives was the development of the country's 
human capital in a market-based system. The labour market was however supply 
I I would like to thank Jeremy Wakeford for his insightful guidance in preparing the research paper. I 











constrained, i.e. there was insufficient manpower (skilled and unskilled) for the work 
that needed to be done, and the economy had to produce the essential manpower. 
Wage determination was and is an integral part of this process. Even though the ex-
liberation fighters were working virtually for free2 until 1994, other civil servants 
were being paid according to the Ethiopian salary scale. In the private sector, wages 
were set according to the forces of demand and supply. Up until 1997 the economy 
was highly influenced by market forces with very little government regulation of the 
labour market. 
Understanding the determinants of earnings in general and the rate of return 
for different levels of education in particular is vital for the efficient gearing of 
investment. In 2002 the Cabinet of Ministers evaluated the educational system of 
Eritrea during the preceding decade and identified as considerable wastage. 3 Eritrea 
remains one of the few African countries for which there has so far been no academic 
study on the returns from investment in education. This paper attempts to fill this gap 
by employing the standard earnings function approach and thereby presenting a policy 
guide for investment in education4. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the human capital 
earnings function mainly due to Jacob Mincer (1974), examines the issue of self-
selection bias and draws attention to the quality versus quantity of schooling debate. 
This section also mentions other sources of bias in the analytical technique that has 
been employed. Section 3 discusses the model specification and motivation for the 
included variables. Section 4 presents the empirical results and discusses the main 
issues surrounding the conventional findings vis-a-vis the Eritrean evidence. Section 5 
concludes the paper by making several policy recommendations. 
2 Ex-liberation fighters were provided with food and accommodation and very minimal pocket money. 
3 www.Shaebia.org 
4 It is to be noted that our methodology provides private rates of return to education, whereas 
government policy should be based on social rates of return to education. The private ratc of return 











2. Theoretical Background 
2.1 Human Capital Theory 
The most common economic theory informing wage determination is the human 
capital theory, which was pioneered by Becker (1964) and Mincer (1974). The 
conventional theory of human capital views education and training as the major 
sources of human capital accumulation. Schooling5 can be seen as a form of 
investment in an individual's productive capacity and therefore earning potentia1. This 
is not, of course, to deny that some pleasure can be derived to schooling at the same 
time; people can and do after all enjoy student life. Yet, schooling is not, however, 
without opportunity costs. Additional schooling necessitates both sacrifices, such as 
earnings forgone, and direct costs, such as tuition, accommodation and other 
expenses. 
By and large the implications of modem human capital theory for education 
can be summarized in three premises. Firstly, net present values of life-long earnings 
should be positive in order to induce an individual to invest in schooling. This is a 
supply side proposition. Secondly, the marginal productivity of workers should 
increase with an increase in years of schooling. More educated workers earn higher 
wages because they are expected to be more productive than their less educated fellow 
workers. Thirdly, as stated by Berndt (1996: 154), "in the long run competitive 
equilibrium the relationship between schooling and life time earnings must be such 
that the supply of and demand for workers of each schooling level are equated, and no 
worker wishes to alter his or her level of scho·oling." This third proposition is a 
statement about market equilibrium in the labour market. Of course, the presumption 
underlying these hypotheses is the existence of a perfectly competitive labour market. 
Even though the absence of perfectly competitive markets is omnipresent in 
economics, we can make the fair assumption that the labour market in Eritrea during 
the time of data collection was liberal and competitive. Market forces mainly 
determined the operation of labour markets. Employers were free to employ workers 











at the agreed-upon wages, and there was no government intervention In wage 
determination in the private sector (Berndt, 1996). 
2.2 The Earnings Function 
Based on the human capital theory Mincer (1974) devised the so-called Mincerian 
earnings function, in which the logarithm of earnings per week (or month or year) is 
expressed as a linear function of the number of years of schooling completed and as a 
linear and quadratic function of potential experience6. This functional notation, which 
is known as the semi-log quadratic earnings function, has been employed mainly for 
three applications. Its first role is to explain earnings variation across individuals and 
through time and across groups of individuals or classes of a society at a point in time. 
This is effectively what this paper does. Secondly, it has in many applications been 
used to measure or estimate the effect of such characteristics as race, region, gender, 
training and other factors. Thirdly, it has been employed to explore the effect of non-
competitive or non-market determined factors on wage determination. However, for 
the standard earnings function to provide such information it must offer a sound 
approximation to actual earnings profiles (Kjellstrom and Bjorklund, 20(2). 
The 'human capital earnings function' (HCEF) has become an essential tool in 
research on wage earnings in developed and developing economies. Even though it 
has many uses, it is most frequently used to make educational policy decisions based 
on estimates of the rate of return to investment in schooling (see, for example, 
Psacharopoulos and Mattson, 1996). The focus of this present study is to explore the 
determinants of earnings in Eritrea. The emphasis will be on years of schooling, 
potential experience, gender, sector of employment, pre-independence history of 
workers, and occupational category. The Mincerian earnings function7, which is 
employed in this paper, can be mathematically expressed as: 
(1) 
6 Mincer defined potential work experience as age years of education - 6, to proxy the number of 
years an individual spends in the labour market, assuming they are continuously employed. The 
quadratic specification of the experience variable retlects the commonly observed concave pattern of 
profile. 
7 The original Mincerian function is 1nn ~ln}'o+bS-C]X 
experience and s years of schooling. 











where Si = Years of schooling 
Xi = Vector of factors other than years of schooling 
Ui Error tern1 
The basic feature of the HeEF is that it relates the natural logarithm of 
earnings to investments in human capital measured over time, such as years of 
schooling and years of post-school work experience. It has several desirable features: 
(1) It is not an ad hoc specification, but is derived from an identity.s As a result, the 
coefficients of the equation have economic interpretations. (2) By using the natural 
logarithm of earnings rather than earnings themselves as the dependent variable, 
because of the positive skewness of earnings and the rise in earnings inequality as 
schooling level increases, the residual variance in the HeEF is less heteroskedastic 
and the distribution of the residuals is closer to normal. (3) It is an efficient user of 
data. Although data on earnings, years of schooling and years since leaving school are 
readily available, data on individual schooling costs are not readily available. The 
HeEF procedure involves converting a relationship between earnings and monetary 
investments in human capital to one between the natural logarithm of earnings and 
years of investment in schooling and training. (4) The HeEF is flexible, allowing for 
easy incorporation of additional variables appropriate for the particular purpose of the 
study. This characteristic is very important to the present study, as it enables the 
inclusion of other variables that are expected to influence earnings in Eritrea. (5) 
Finally, the coefficients of the HeEF are devoid of units, facilitating comparisons 
across space (e.g., countries) or across time periods (e.g., decades). 
As mentioned above, one feature of the HeEF is its frequent use for 
estimating the rate of return to education, experience and other relevant variables. 
Particularly, the coefficient of the schooling variable is often interpreted as the rate of 
return to schooling (Willis, 1986). However it is important to distinguish between the 
internal rate of return derived from cost benefit analysis and the coefficient of the 
schooling term from the Mincerian earnings equation. Whereas the internal rate of 
SIf we assume that the rate of return to education is uniform for all levels of education. 
Y, Yo (l H,)(1 + r2 ) •.. (1 H,) (1) where r rate of return for education, s = years of schooling. If we 
approximate (I H) by e r , then (1) can be written as Y, '" (2). Also (1) can be appended with a 












return takes into account both costs and benefits of any project, the schooling 
coefficient from the earnings function is a rough estimate of the rate of return to 
education because it only takes into account the stream of earnings (benefits). 
Furthermore, the latter approach makes a number of simplifying assumptions. It 
assumes that the only costs of schooling are forgone earnings. It does not take into 
account tuition, accommodation and other direct costs. Moreover, it does not 
incorporate earnings (gained or lost) while attending school9. Clearly, the Mincerian 
earnings function is not without flaws. The following section thus mentions the major 
sources of bias within the conventional approach. 
2.2.1. Self-selection Problem 
The main assumption fundamental to the use of statistical earnmgs functions to 
estimate the rate of return to schooling is that schooling precisely represents the set of 
opportunities faced by a representative individual (after controlling for observed 
exogenous characteristics in our model such as race, age or sex). If it does, it is 
suitable for answering questions of the sort: "What would a given individual's 
expected life cycle earnings path be if he/she chooses SI rather than S 2 years of 
schooling?"(Wills, 1986). 
A large literature addresses the issue of the extent to which the estimated rate 
of return to education is upward biased. The main reason for this is because ability is 
unobserved and "high ability" individuals, on average, have higher schooling 
attainment than "low ability" individuals. If so, the error term U i in (1) will be 
positively correlated with Si and the estimated earnings function will be subject to an 
"ability bias" which overstates the earnings gain a person of given ability would 
achieve through increased schooling. In other words, the level of schooling might be 
determined by the ability of individuals, and hence higher earnings may be attributed 
partly to the ability of individuals and not to the level of education per se. 
9 The estimated rate of return is the private rate of return to education. It does not take into account 
public subsidisation of schooling, or any positive and negative externalities associated with schooling. 











There are two fundamental problems associated with ability. Firstly, it is impossible 
to observe the life cycle earnings path of the same individual who has made 
alternative schooling investments. Secondly, it is impossible to observe all the factors, 
which affect his/her earning opportunities. We can only observe the earning levels of 
a given individual who has selected a given level of schooling. 
Unfortunately, since there is no inforn1ation about the ability of individuals in 
our data set, there may be certain shortcomings in our analysis. 10 However, as the aim 
is to determine the factors which may affect earnings in Eritrea, it is not unjustifiable 
to employ the years of educational attainment to estimate the rate of return to 
schooling, with the proviso that it may incorporate the effect of ability on earnings. 
The fundamental behavioral hypothesis of economics is the presumption that 
economic agents select the most preferred alternative from their set of opportunities. 
As the complete opportunity set cannot be observed and as opportunities vary across 
parents, the operation of optimal choice implies that market data may be 
systematically censored. Consequently, there is no guarantee that estimates based on 
interpersonal differences in earnings and schooling will accurately estimate the 
opportunity set of any individual in the popUlation. Hence there is a need to employ 
appropriate econometric techniques to tackle these issues (Maddala, 1977). 
In the milieu of the literature on investment in schooling this has come to be 
known as the self-selection problem (Rosen, 1987). This issue is an omnipresent 
problem in economics and will present thorny econometric problems in any situation 
in which the full opportunity set of each agent is not observed. Since many of the 
empirical issues, including the question of ability, that have arisen in the earnings 
function literature can be interpreted in terms of the self-selection problem, caution is 
needed in any attempt to interpret the econometrics results in this paper. Thus the first 
issue in any empirical findings regarding the relationship between earnings and 
schooling is the methodology of estimation, which takes into account the nature of the 
data. 











2.2.2. Quality versus Quantity of Schooling 
Another issue to consider in the discussion of rates of return to schooling is the 
quantity versus quality debate. In most cases the quantity of schooling is 
represented by years or grades of schooling attained. But a failure to control for 
significant differences in the quality of schooling in earnings function estimates 
may cause biases in the estimated returns to schooling. 
Excluding the quality aspect of schooling renders the estimates of the 
coefficients most probably not BLUE. I I The possible biases may be downward or 
upward, but the bias is more likely to be positive because of the positive 
correlation between quality and quantity of schooling. The bias may also be 
considerable if quality plays an important role in the actual relationship. 
Even though it is theoretically sound to include quality of schooling in the 
rate of return estimation, there are certain problems with the practical application 
of this suggestion. It is very difficult to obtain a consistent and standard measure of 
schooling quality in practice. There is no generally agreed upon quality index, 
which can be employed for such studies. An attempt to compile an index for 
quality would also be very costly and often may not be very rewarding (Behrman 
and Birdsall, 1983). Thus the choice of a proxy for quality remains highly 
normative. Among the variables used as a proxy for quality measures are the 
teacher-pupil ratio, schooling expenditure per pupil and the teacher's level of 
education. 
Fortunately, there seem to be no noticeable differences in quality of 
schooling in Eritrea. Almost all schools in Eritrea are state-owned. There is only 
one international school, which is privately owned, and two Italian schools. In 
these private schools most of the students are non-Eritrean nationals and they all go 
to Italy after completing high school. There is one Teachers Training Institute 
(TTl) in Eritrea. There is also only one university, the University of Asmara 
(UOA), in the whole country. The teachers in the elementary school are recruited 
in TTl and the secondary school teachers are graduates of the University of 











Asmara. Teachers are assigned by the Head Office of the Ministry of Education. 
Moreover, since our data set is from the urban areas of Eritrea, we can assume that 
there are no major quality differences in school quality and thus our estimates may 
not suffer from the aforementioned bias. 
In addition to the above, our model may suffer from variable omission bias 
and measurement error. The latter is especially important to consider, given the fact 
that this was the very first survey in Eritrea and that questionnaires about income or 
earnings are very sensitive. The measurement of wage or earnings in a society such 
as Eritrea is not an easy task. Moreover, it has been very common for the majority of 
Eritrean households not to report income honestly for political and economic reasons. 
We can thus expect some measurement error bias to be present in our data. To 
minimize the problem of variable omission bias, this study attempts to include the 
major variables which are supposed to affect earnings in Eritrea. 
3. Data 
The data are drawn from the Eritrean Household Income and Expenditure Survey 
(EHIES), an urban survey that was conducted in the large towns of Eritrea in 1996. It 
was designed to be able to report separately from five main geographical reporting 
domains corresponding to the three large towns, the Highlands and the Western 
Lowlands. The National Statistics Office selected a sample size of 5,061 households. 
The absence of any operational sampling framework in the country necessitated 
complete mapping and listing of all households in all towns except in one town, 
Keren. The sampling method employed was one-stage stratified sampling in all towns. 
Simple random sampling was used to choose households from the selected clusters. 
The survey was conducted from July to September 1996 in four rounds. The 
main reason for this was to incorporate seasonal variations in data collection. Of the 
selected total 5,061 households, the surveyors were able to include 4,644 households 
in the data. The non-response rate was very low. However, the data do not include all 
the variables needed for the analysis, and the data set also has many missing 
observations and some outliers. These problems are omnipresent in most developing 











infonnation and anomalies. No income and expenditure survey12 except for the survey 
conducted during the Ethiopian colonisation, which treats Eritrea as a province of 
Ethiopia. EHIES 96 is the only available data set relevant for our analysis. By and 
large it contains the basic variables included in the standard Mincerian earnings 
function. 
The unavailability of individual level data has discouraged researchers fTom 
examining the nature of the labour market in post-independence Eritrea. 
Consequently, so far no research known to the author has estimated wage or earnings 
equations for Eritrea. By using individual level data, this paper attempts to fill this gap 
by estimating the return to human capital characteristics and the variations of earnings 
by sector, gender, region and occupation. It also controls for the endogeneity of 
employment choice. 
4. Model Specification 
As discussed in Section 2 above, the Mincerian earnings function has been widely 
used to estimate the returns to education and other investment in human capital. These 
estimates have very important effects on policy debates. Fashionably, following 
Mincer (1974), almost all studies include in their specification years of schooling, 
work experience and work experience squared. As previously explained in Section 2, 
the popularity of this specification stems partly from simplicity and convenience in 
interpretation. However, it should be noted that this specification makes the following 
bold assumptions: 
i) The appropriate definition of the dependent variable is the logarithm of 
earnings as opposed to earnings as such or any other functional form. 
ii) There is no interaction between the contributions ofthe schooling and work 
experience variables to earnings. 
iii) A single model can be employed to model life-time earnings, making no 
distinction between early and mature labour market experience. 
[Dougherty and Jimenez, 1991: 85] 
After a thorough test of the validity of the specifications, Dougherty and 
Jimenez (1991) found that the semi-logarithmic earnings function is superior to its 
linear counterpart. They further argue that the semi-logarithmic transfonnation is 
supported by the Box-Cox transfonnation, by relative heteroskedasticity in both 











schooling and work experience dimensions, and by relative normal distribution of the 
residuals (Dougherty and Jimenez, 1991). Among simple transformations the natural 
logarithm of earnings is a more appropriate dependent variable in earnings functions 
(Heckman and Polachek, 1974). On other hand, Assadzadeh and Paul (2001) argue 
that the semi-log quadratic specification fits the actual earnings profiles very poorly. 
Kjellstrom and Bjokrkurnd (2002) also warn that the semi-log Mincerian earnings 
function can be misleading in some cases. Although the debate is not settled, the 
majority of earnings function studies use the semi-log Mincerian specification. 
With this in mind, this study uses the Mincerian earnings function to examine 
the determination of personal earnings in Eritrea. The list of potential determinants of 
earnings is however broadened to include occupation, gender, pre-independence 
history of individuals and region. The model is specified as follows: 
LNWAGE fJo + fJlEDULEV + fJ2EXPER - fJ3EXPER2 + U (2.1) 
LNWAGE== fJo + fJIEDULEV+ fJ2EXPER- p,EXPER + fJ4GENDER+ fJsPFDJ+ fJ6ETHNIC 
+ fJ7ASMARINOr fJgOTHERS+U 
(2.2) 
Equations 2.1 and 2.2 are the standard and expanded earnmgs functions 
respectively. The variables are defined as follows: In wage is the natural logarithm of 
gross average monthly income; edulev is years of schooling completed; exper is 
years of potential experience; gender = 1 if male and gender =:: 0 if female; 
EPLF = 1 if the individual is an ex-fighter and EPLF 0 if the individual was not a 
fighter; Ethnic = 1 if ethnicity is Tigrigna and Ethnicity = 0 otherwise, if ethnicity is 
not Tigrigna; Asmarino::::: 1 if town is Asmara and Asmarino 0 otherwise. Others is 
any other variable of interest to be included in the wage equation, such as a set of 
occupational or sectoral dummy variables. U is the error term. Each variable will now 
be described and motivated in greater detail. 
Gross Average Monthly Income 
The average monthly wage ascertained from each individual is defined to include 
regular wages, bonus, allowances, subsidies, welfare payments, and income from 











distribution of the selected sub-sample is reported in Figure 1. The figure also shows 
that In wage is nearly normally distributed with mean 5.914652 and standard 







Frequency distribution of Inwages 
6 
Inwage 
Source: HIES Eritrea, 1996/97 
Figure 1. Frequency distribution of Inwages 
Years of Schooling 
8 10 
It is well known that schooling and income are positively correlated. The magnitude 
and degree of the effect of different schooling levels on earnings have been however 
contestable. It has been argued in the literature that different school years impart 
different skills and productivity. Hence it is naIve to assume a uniform rate of return 
for all educational levels. In order to study the effect of school years at different levels 
of education, Van der Gaag and Vijverberg (1989), for instance, divided the years of 
schooling according to the school systems of Cote d'Ivoire. Similarly, Khandker 
(1990) also used the years of primary, secondary and post-secondary schooling in a 
wage function for Peru. Both studies found significant differences in returns to 
education at different levels of education. Following Van der Gaag and Vijverberg 
(1989), we similarly divided the school years into eight categories according to the 
education system of Eritrea. In Eritrea, the primary education consists of 6 years of 
schooling; middle requires 2 more years; and by completing 4 more years of 











schooling after middle, an individual obtains a secondary school certificate i.e., 
Matric. In secondary school after grade 10 students have a choice between technical 
(vocational) and formal education. A technical education diploma can be obtained 
from technical institutions which award a diploma after 3 years of education, while 
those who go the normal education route receive a high school certificate after 2 years 
(grade 12). After the completion of secondary school or technical school, students can 
join the University of Asmara, the only university in Eritrea. Thus in the latter 
estimation schooling was entered as linear splines. The splines were defined for zero 
education, elementary education (1-6) middle school, (6-7), senior secondary (9-12) 
certificate from university, vocational training, university incomplete (13-16), 
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Figure 2. Schooling-earnings profile 
The splines allow the effects on earnings of each of the schooling levels to 
vary, while constraining annual effects within each of the schooling levels to be 
identical. The coefficients on the splines are interpreted in the same way as is a 
coefficient on a continuous school variable. It is interpreted as the percentage change 
in earnings due to a unitary change in years of education (Gujarati, 1996). Figure 2 











was created by imposing a second order polynomial relation using the estimated 
coefficients for education and education squared instead of a simple scatter plot. 14 
This was done to investigate whether the relationship is not linear and unifonn for all 
levels of education. Figure 2 shows that the relationship between education and wages 
is positive and increasing. The rate of return to education increases as years of 
education rise. The earnings-schooling profile is thus convex to the origin. In order to 
examine the returns to education at different levels of education, this paper employs 
education splines, which provide a more detailed picture of the pattern of returns. 
Potential \Vork Experience 
Actual experience is not obtainable from the HIES 96/97. For this reason potential 
experience is employed as a proxy. Following Mincer (1993) approximate potential 
experience is defined as a worker's age minus years of schooling and age of entrance 
to school. That is, years of experience age years of schooling - 7, because the age 
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Source: EHIES 1996/1997 
Figure 3. Age-Earnings Profile 




















Source: EIEHS 1996/97 
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Figure 4. Experience-earnings profile 
60 80 
Employing potential experience as a proxy for actual work experience is not 
without flaws though. It will overstate the actual amount of experience because it 
assumes that a worker is continuously employed throughout his/her life after school. 
However, a worker can be unemployed for a number of years after school. Workers 
also can be frictionally unemployed to change between jobs. 
Experience squared is included to test whether the effect of experience on 
earnings is concave. Figures 3 and 4 clearly show the rate of return for experience 
increases until 20-25 years of experience. However, after more than 25 years 
experience, at about the age 50-55, the rate of return from experience becomes 
negative. In most earnings function estimations the implied earnings-experience 
profile is concave (Willis, 1986). 
Gender 
Figure 5 below shows the schooling earnmgs profile by sex. Average earnmgs 
increase with an increase in the level of education. The Figure shows that mean 
earnings for all levels of education are higher for male workers than for their female 
counterparts, except for the senior secondary level. This may be explained by the 
small sample size of females who have senior secondary qualification. A gender 











and males, all other things remammg constant. In addition, separate earnmgs 
functions are estimated for males and females to examine the relationship of the 
human capital characteristics with earnings in male and female sub samples. 
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Source: EHIES Eritrea, 1996/97 
Figure 5. Mean earnings and years of schooling 
Ethnicity 
An ethnicity variable is included in the study because it is hypothesized that the 
Tigrigna people, the majority, are expected to be more exposed to education and other 
public services, which makes their opportunity to invest in schooling significantly 
Table 1. Distribution of the sample by ethnic group 
Frequency Percent 
Afar 1423 1.9 
Billen 2850 3.7 
Hedareb 84 0.1 
Kunarna 1779 2.3 
Nara 2137 2.8 
Rashaida 71 0.1 
Saho 2406 3.2 
Tigre 13914 18.3 
Tigrigna 41552 54 .6 
Other 237 0.3 
not asked 9630 12.7 
Information missing 41 0.10 











Source: ERIES Eritrea, 1996/97 
higher than any other group. In addition, since the majority of the Tigrigna ethnic 
group are located in relatively metropolitan areas, their probability of wage 
employment is higher. The above differences will be captured by the education and 
regional variables. The ethnicity dummy is introduced for Tigrigna and non-Tigrigna 
to capture any effect of ethnicity on earnings, keeping all other things constant. This is 
used to explore the possibility of racial discrimination in a crude way, i.e. by 
speculating whether certain rewards are not related to education, experience etc. As 
shown in Table 2 above, the Tigrigna population comprises about 55% of the 
sample. IS 
EPLF dummy for party membership 
A party member identifier is specifically included, as we expect ex-fighters to enjoy 
some special premium considering the importance of their participation in the armed 
struggle. In other words, the role of the pre-independence history of individuals in the 
determination of earnings in Eritrea is expected to be significant. Generally, party 
members are better educated than non-ex-fighters. The mean educational level for ex-
fighters is 8.81 years, whereas for non-ex-fighters it is 7.5, years which is not much 
different, though. The average age for ex- fighters is 35 years, whereas for non-ex-
fighters it is 38 years, again this is not that different. When we look at work 
experience, we find that non-ex-fighters are more experienced than ex-fighters. This 
seemingly real difference in experience is because the number of years the ex-fighters 
spent in the armed struggle, as soldiers, were considered as work experience in post-
independence Eritrea as civil servants. By and large, in all aspects the differences 
between the mean characteristics of these two groups are small. What is striking is the 
earnings differential. The average salary for an ex-fighter is 804 ERN per month, 
whereas it is a mere 436 ERN for non-ex-fighters. The ratio of the mean salary of ex-
fighters to that of non-ex-fighters is 1.84. That is, the mean earnings of ex-fighters are 
84% higher than the average earnings of non-ex-fighters. There is therefore, a 
noticeable earnings gap between ex-fighters and non-ex-fighters in post-independence 
15 The ethnicity dummy was found to be insignificant in all specifications and hence it is not reported in 











Eritrea. Thus the EPLF dummy is employed as a proxy for the pre-independence 
history of workers as one of the determinants of earnings in Eritrea. 
Regional Dummy "ASMARINOI6" 
It is expected - and true - that earnings in Eritrea are not the same in the capital 
Asmara and other towns. There are substantial regional income level differences in 
Eritrea. A verage income in the capital Asmara is more than twice as high as the 
average income in the other towns of the Highlands and Lowlands. It should be noted, 
however, that the composition of income in the Highlands and Lowlands is not same 
(EHIES, 1998). The 'ASMARINO' regional dummy is included in our model to 
capture regional variation. That is ASMARINO=1 if the town is Asmara and 
ASMARINO=O otherwise. 
5. Empirical Results 
In this section the estimated Mincerian earnmgs functions are reported. The 
methodology employed will range from the simple standard specification to the 
extended earnings function. That is to say the Mincerian earnings function will be 
built up to test the different hypotheses. The specification will be broadened in such a 
way that it includes other relevant determinants of earnings in subsequent stages. 
5.1. The Standard Mincerian Earnings Function 17 
In this section the standard earnings function is fitted, in which the logarithm of 
earnings per month is expressed as a linear function of the number of years completed 
and as a quadratic function of years since leaving school or work experience. Results 
are reported in Table 2. This estimation is done so as to compare the rate of return 
estimates for schooling and experience with the corresponding education literature of 
developing countries. Earnings functions similar to those reported in Table 2 have 
been estimated many times using cross-sectional data for many countries (Willis, 
1986). Table 2 reports the ordinary least-square estimates (OLS) of the standard 
16 Asmarino is an Italian term applied to individuals who are born and brought up in Asmara, the 
capital city. 
PAll models were tested for hetroskedasticity using White's test for hetroskedasticity; null hypothesis, 
Ho: homoskedasticity against alternative hypothesis Ha: unrestricted heteroskedastici1y. The null 











earnings equation by using HIES data for Eritreal8 . Table 1 reports results for males 
and females separately. In both cases, in column 1 and 2, all the coefficients are 
significant at 1 % level and have the expected signs. The overall model, column 3, 
explains about 38% of the variation in earnings. The explanatory power of the model 
as a whole is quite robust and comparable with and in some cases even higher than the 
basic earnings functions estimated for developing countries (for example, see 
Psacharopolous , 1973, Psacharopolous and Woodhall, 1985, Psacharopolous and 
Robert, 1996 and Siphambe, 2000). The education coefficient, which is a crude 
measure of rate ofreturn to schooling, is 9.65%. Psacharopolous and Patrinos (2002), 
report the average rate of return for schooling to be 11.7% for sub-Saharan Africa 
countries and 9.7% for the world average. The lower rate of return to education in 
Eritrea vis-ii-vis the other Sub-Saharan African countries may be explained by the 
lower earnings forgone. For instance, in Eritrea, a professor's salary would not be 
enough to own a car. The government, which employs 80% of post-high school 
graduates, pays little attention to school and more to other factors such as the pre-
Table 2. Standard Earnings function. Dependent variable is lnwage 
Constant 










































18 A tobit model was estimated and there seems to be no significant change in the sign and size of 
coefficients. This is explained by the fact that the number of censored observations is very small vis-a-












independence history of the worker and party affiliation in setting the salary scale. 
Briefly, the benefits accruing to additional years of schooling are low in Eritrea. The 
result of this study overlaps exactly with the world average. 
It is to be noted that in the above estimations the influence of years of 
schooling on earnings is treated as linear and constant throughout the different levels 
of education. Its effect is, as expected, positive and significant. This model is naive in 
a sense, though, because it assumes the rate of return for all education levels to be 
uniform throughout. In Section 5.2, this assumption will be relaxed and splines will be 
employed. 
The effect of experience is found to be positive and significant in linear temlS. 
When experience squared was introduced, it was found to be significant and negative. 
There is a peak level of experience, at which experience affects earnings positively. 
Experience adds positively to earnings until the age of 5219. Thereafter, though, there 
are diminishing returns from experience. This agrees with the age-earnings profile 
reported in Section 4 and is also in line with Becker's hypothesis (1974). 
In Table 2, the model has a larger explanatory power for females, OLS (2) 
with an R~ of 41.29% as compared with 31.18% for males, OLS (I). All coefficients 
are significant at the I % level of significance and have the expected signs for both 
sexes. Females have higher rate of return to education, viz. 10.4% compared with 
8.3% for males. These results are in line with many findings and may be attributed to 
the lower forgone earnings of females compared with their male counterparts (see 
Figure 5). The higher private rate of return for females also explains their relative 
scarcity in the labour market. This analysis is replicated for the extended earnings 
function in later sections. 
The results in Table 2, columns 1, 2 and 3 may potentially be subject to 
selection bias. The results are estimated for only those individuals who were working 
for wages, resulting in a censored sample of the popUlation. The problem is that 













unobserved wage offers for those not working are probably lower than for those 
persons who are in the sample2o . The wage information of the employed is hereafter 
extrapolated to the unemployed. To check for these effects, the Maximum Likelihood 
Heckman two-stage model is utilised. The results for this Heckman two-step method 
are summarised in Table 3. 
Censored data and Sample selection2l 
The two-stage estimation procedure suggested by Heckman mainly captures the 
common structure of models of censoring, sample selection and truncation. In all 
cases we have a dependent variable In wage; , which is completely observed only for a 
sub-sample (the employed wage earners) of our total sample. Whether In wage. is 
I 
completely observed or not can depend on the value of In wage; itself (in which case 
we have simple censoring) or upon the value of another variablez;, say the variable 
employed; 22 in our case, (in which case we have a sample selection issue). The 
difference between censoring and sample selection is that in the former we have 
information on both selected and non-selected samples. The difference between 
censoring and truncation is that in the latter we only have data of the selected sub-
sample. Therefore, whereas for censored and sample selected data we can model both 
the selection stage (the probability that a given worker is employed) and the outcome 
stage (the expected value ofln wage! , conditional upon a worker being employed), for 
truncated data we can only model the latter (Breen, 1996). 
The basic model for censored data is the so-called tobit23 model, following 
Tobin (1958). One very common interpretation of the tobit and other similar models, 
is in terms of underlying latent variables, In wage *, whereas In wage is the actual 
observation. In our case In wage * will be the true wage and the observed wage rate 
(monthly) would be denoted byln wage. That is, In wage * will be the capacity of 
individuals to earn a certain wage rate, but this is only realised if the actual monthly 
10 The nature of unemployment in Eritrea is mostly of voluntary in nature as a result of negative 
attitudes to some jobs( unpublished report, Labour Office, Asmara, 1997). 
21 This section is mainly taken from Breen (1996). 
22 employed 0 if the worker is unemployed and employed = I if the worker is employed. The ERIES 
96/97 uses a narrow definition for unemployment. 











salary exceeds zero. Therefore, even though many observations (about 41 in our 
sample) may have an identical value zero on the realized variable, they can be 
considered to vary on the latent variable. The model in terms of the underlying 
variable can be written as: 
, 24 
In wage. = X.f3 + u· , I I (3) 
and the relationship between the latent and actual In ~1/age can be written as 
In wagei In wage * if In wage* > e; 
In wagei = elf In wage* ~ e 
(4) 
where e is the threshold for censoring ( e o in our sample). Our model, if written in 
terms of observed monthly salary, In wage and allowing the censoring threshold to be 
zero, is then: 
In wagei = x;f3 + u, if In wage, > 0 (5) 
In wagei 0 Otherwise. 
The formula for an expected value of a variable, which is censored at e 0 can be 
stated as: 
E(ln wagei I Xi) = pr(ln wage> 0 I Xi )E(ln wagei lIn wage; > 0, Xi) . (6) 
This can also be estimated by the two-stage Heckman model. Lets us present both 
stages of Heckman's procedure. 
Selection stage 
Note that In wage> 0 implies Xi f3 + Ui > 0 and hence ui > f3. That is, the 
probability of In wage> 0 means the probability that U j > f3 . Since U . is normally 
I 
distributed, we are looking for the probability of u exceeding Zi' where in this case 
Zi = -;<f3. After a certain mathematical derivation25 the selection stage can be 
( 
X:f3J x'JJ/a 1 ~ 
denoted by <1> i == <1> -" 1_ '= J -- exp( -t ~ 12)dt 
() -if) -J2n: 
(7) 
24 Assumptions: (1) II, are independent and normally distributed errors with a zero mean and constant 
variance a 2 ; (2) correct functional fonn ofthe model: (3) no measurement error (4) no omitted variable 
from the model specification. It is worth noting that these models are less robust to the violation of 
underlying assumptions. 
25 But because the nonnal distribution is symmetric, the probability that a nonnally distributed variable 











where cP i is the nonnal distribution function evaluated at a probability of x; fJ I cr and 
¢i is the density which corresponds to that probability. 
Equation 7 is the standard nonnal distribution function and it tells us nothing 
but the probability that a standardised normally distributed random variable (with 
mean zero and standard deviation of one) is less than or equal to x, fJ I cr. This 
probability is equal to the proportion of the area under the standard normal curve that 
lies between - (fJ and x, fJ I cr. This probability can be estimated by a probit model 
(Amenya, 1984). In this probit model cr and fJ are not independently known. The 
parameters estimated for this model are then fJ . However most of the time, for the 
cr 
sake of simplicity, we assume cr 1 (Breen, 1996). 
Outcome stage 
The second stage of the estimation is the outcome stage. Note that from condition (4) 
if In wage* ~ ° , we have zero observations on In wage. Therefore we need to estimate 
only the expected value of In wage, conditional on In wage >0. This can be written as: 
,. 
E(ln wage lIn wage> 0, Xi) x,fJ + 0';1., , (8) 
A 
where }"i ¢i I cP i , which is known as the inverse Mills ratio or hazard rate. 
Another way to estimate the model is to use the rule of conditional probabilities. 26 
This can be written as: 
The probability that a nonnally distributed random variable with a zero mean and a variance of 0- 2 is 
less than or equal to xj3 is denoted by F(x;{J, 0- 2 ) or F, for short. This is given 
',j) 
by Fi = F(x,{J,c;') =' J J I 2 exp(-t' 12c;')dt. This probability is equal to the proportion of the area under a 
-r 2Jrc; 
nonnal curve. With a mean zero and a standard deviation ofc; that lies between (fJ and xjJ . In tum, 
however, F, is equal to a quantity we denote cD(x,{J! c;) or cD i for short, 
26 The expected value of a random variable y is the sum of the products of the probability of y falling 
into one set of disjoint intervals, and the expected value of y in that interval. Let f" (/1 I.2,Ln) be the 
expected value of the intervals, then mathematically: E(y) = Ipr(y E I" )E(), I J I,,) (l). By the same token 
11=--1 











E(ln wage I x,) = cDJr, 'fl + a! ] (9) 
To estimate 9 we first need to estimate the probit, which will give us the first 
stage denoted by cD i in equation 9. The conditional expectation of In wage is then 
estimated by replacing cD i and ¢i with their estimated values from the probit relation, 
so that we get the following relation 
" 
E(ln wage I x,) = cD flx, + a ¢, (10) 
Equation 10 can be estimated via OLS, but this time by using all the sample 
observations.27 Despite the simplicity of estimating the model via OLS, there are 
some difficulties. The estimated standard errors of the coefficients and a are all 
incorrect (Breen, 1996). These difficulties can be dealt with by using Maximum 
Likelihood estimation (MLE), though. Therefore this paper estimates the Heckman 
two-stage model by using this method. 
Table 3 summarises the OLS and Heckman two-stage models in columns 1 
and 2, respectively. The problem is that the estimates in column 1 are based on 
information from only those who are working, resulting in a censored sub-sample. 
The expectation is that the unobserved potential wage rates for those who are 
unemployed are lower than those observed in the sample. The Heckman estimates in 
column 2 correct for this difficulty. The results of the Heckman two-stage estimation 
show that the coefficient for years of schooling is reduced by about 0.3% on average. 
That is, the rate of return was overstated by 0.3% in the OLS results. The inverse 
Mills ratio is also negative and significant at the 1 % degree of level of significance. 
where the subscript i denotes the ith individual in the sample and both x and j3 are column vectors. If 
we assume a dichotomizing of the values of In wage around a constant c then it can be written as 
E(ln wage, I x,) = pr(ln wage, > C I x, )E(ln wage, lin wage, c,xi ) + pr(Jn wage, <: C ! x,)E(ln \\'iIgel In wage, c, XI) (3). 
Because In ll'ilgC, is now dichotornised with respect to c, the probability that In wage, is less than or equal 
to c is equal to one minus the probability that In wage, is greater than c. Then (3) can be \vTitten as 
E(ln wage, I x) pr(ln wage, C : x, )E(ln wage, lin wage, > c,x,) + [I pr(ln wage, > c I x, )JE(ln wage, lin wage, <: c,x,) (4). If 
we have truncation of In wagei from below at the value c where c = ° then the expected value of our 
observed In \l'iIge, is simply: E(ln wage;! XI) = pr(ln wage, > ° Ix, lE(ln wage, lin wage, O,x,) (5). It follows from 
equation (5) that we need to estimate the selection stage (the probability of not being censored) and the 
outcome stage (expected value of the observation conditional on not being censored) to estimate (2) 
when there is a censoring problem, for instance the sample selection problem in this paper, where 
In \I agel is conditional upon being employed. 











The interpretation of the negative sign of the selectivity term is that actual wage rates 
are lower than the wage rate of any randomly selected worker. A second possible 
explanation of this term is that the employed wage earners do not necessarily have a 
comparative advantage. It is worth noting also that the model is significant as a whole. 
Table 3. OLS and Heckman estimates for the standard Mincerian earnings function 
Constant 
Years of schooling 
Experience 
Experience squared 




at 1 % of significance 




























So far the discussion has been confined to estimating the standard Mincerian earnings 
function for Eritrea. In this section the model is expanded to include additional 
independent variables. The assumption to be relaxed is that different levels of 
schooling have the same effect on earnings. Different schooling splines are thus 
introduced for elementary (grade I to 6), middle (grade 7 and 8), secondary (grade 9-
12), university incomplete, first year to fourth year university dropouts, university 











degree. Table 4 below shows the expanded earnings results, based on both OLS and 
Heckman two-step estimators.28 




















***Significant at I % of significance 






























































Almost all the coefficients in Table 4 are in accordance with the theoretical 
expectations. All the education splines except the university certificate have the 
18 The tobit model was also attempted because of the possible incidental truncation of the sample. 
However the results were very similar to those ofOLS. It follows that our sample does not seem to 











expected coefficient sign?9 The OLS model overstates the rates of return to education 
in almost all cases. The Heckman two-stage results are deemed more reliable, as they 
account for sample selection bias; the adjustment term (Inverse Mills ratio) is 
significant. In terms of the profitability of education, the highest rate of return is 
found to be for technical school or university diploma. Investing in technical school 
and college education are thus the most profitable areas for an individual in Eritrea. 
The rate of return for technical school graduates is 32.2%. The next highest rate of 
return is found among university degree graduates, 25.3%. The coefficient of 
postgraduate education is statistically insignificant. This may be explained by the 
small number of observations for postgraduates. There are only 27 postgraduate 
degree holders in the sample. The findings from this paper do not support the ongoing 
Eritrean Human Resources Development (ERRD) programme. As part of the national 
development plan, the Government of the State of Eritrea is currently investing about 
53 million USD in postgraduate training. 3o This is a high cost for Eritrea. The total 
services expenditure for the Eritrea in 2001 was only about 70 million USD (Ministry 
of Finance, 2000). Of course there may be some non-wage benefits for the society 
from the project, such as institution building, for instance. Moreover, this study is 
somewhat limited in that it does not include the costs associated with each educational 
level. It is worth remembering that the estimated coefficients are rough estimates of 
the rate of return to education that could be found from cost benefit analysis. 
The highest private rate of return to a technical school graduate is in line with the 
relatively high demand for technical school graduates. Since the country has entered 
the reconstruction stage, the demand for technicians has been high. In addition to the 
fact that there are only two technical schools in the country, the supply is still far 
behind the demand. This high demand for technical school graduates emanates from 
two sources. The first direct demand is the demand for technical school graduates in 
the aftermath of independence in the reconstruction and rebuilding of the nation. 
29 Table 6 suggests that there are increasing returns to education as opposed to the neoclassical theory 
of diminishing returns to education. The findings from Eritrea tend to disagree with the concave 
relationship of earnings and years of schooling. The relationship is found to be convex. These findings 
tend to agree with the South African findings (Keswell and Poswell, 2003). The implication for 
inequality and poverty is that education exacerbates income inequality and this suggests the prevalence 
of poverty trap. 
30 The HRD project is mainly being carried out in South African Universities and Technicons, where 
close to 600 students both at postgraduate and undergraduate levels are studying. This HRD project is 











Secondly, smce the University of Asmara was only able to produce engmeenng 
diploma graduates in 1998; technical school graduates were in the interim in most 
cases working as engineers, even though they did not have the correct qualifications. 
This pushed up the demand even further. For instance, technical school graduates 
were in high demand on the projects that were initiated after independence, such as 
the Sembel Housing complex, Hirgogo Power plant, Massawa Airport etc. In these 
specific projects, they were working as assistant engineers and in some instances even 
as engmeers. 
Another variable of interest to consider is the EPLF dummy. The EPLF 
dummy is included as a party member identifier, as we expect the ex-fighters, as party 
members, to enjoy some special premium considering the importance of their pre-
independence history. According to Table 4 above, the coefficient for EPLF is 
positive and significant at the 1 % level. This is in line with our expectation. The 
interpretation of the coefficient for the dummy variable for party membership, 
following Halvorsen and Palmquise l (1980), is that the mean salary of ex-fighters is 
85.417% higher than that of non-ex -fighters, all other things remaining constant. This 
matches the ratio of mean earnings of ex-fighters to non-ex-fighters in our sample. 
This is in fact a shocking result, and may imply an element of discrimination. 
Although this is a very crude and simple way of estimating discrimination there does 
indeed seem to be discrimination against non-ex -fighters or "Gebar" as the ex -fighters 
like to call them. This is in line with what Arneberg (1999: 7) reports. He explains this 
earnings differential as follows: "the reason is that ex-fighters, who commonly work 
for the government, receive wages above that of persons with an equal level of fonnal 
education. This might be justified by the practical experience and training they 
received during the war or after, but the practice is also a political decision." 
The proxy for the regional dummy is also found to be positive and significant. 
This confonns to expectations. The interpretation of the coefficient for the Asmarino 
dummy is that the mean salary of an individual who resides in Asmara is about 13.5% 
higher than of those who stay in other towns or regions, all other things remaining 
constant. This is in line with the report from the EHIES that the average income in the 
31 The coefficient of a dummy variable is interpreted by taking the natural antilog of the estimated 











capital Asmara is more than twice as high as the average income in towns in the 
Highlands and Lowlands. The discrepancy between the reports and this study's 
findings may be explained by the fact that in our model the earnings differential is 
captured by education and experience. That is to say, because the people around 
Asmara have better access to schooling, health and other public services, they are also 
more educated than the individuals in the other regions of the country, and hence able 
to command higher wages. 
5.2.1 Earnings Variation by Sector of Employment 
Table 5 summarises the extended Mincerian earnings functions by sector of 
employment. According to this Table, the rates of return to education differ 
substantially between private and public sector employment. The rate of return to 
primary education is higher in the public sector than in the private sector. While the 
rate of return to primary school completion is about 6.5% for the private sector, it is 
higher in the public sector, amounting to 10.8%. However, for junior and secondary 
education the rate of return is higher in the private sector than the public sector, i.e. 
for junior school the rate of return to schooling is 11.7% and 7.3% in the private and 
public sectors respectively. The rate of return to secondary education is 13.1 % and 
9%for the private and public sectors, respectively. This suggests the relative 
employability of junior and secondary school Ie avers in the private sector. This may 
be explained by two factors. Firstly, the private sector wage has been adjusting to 
relative demand and supply factors. In the public sector however, wages are relatively 
highly administered. Secondly, the higher rate of return may reflect relatively lower 
security of employment in the private sector vis-a-vis the public sector. Turning to the 
rate of return to postgraduate education, it is statistically insignificant in both cases, as 
it is in the whole sample. As mentioned earlier, though, this could be due to the small 
number of observations available. 
University or technical school certificates have no significant effect on earnings. In 
both sectors the relevant coefficient turned out to be statistically insignificant. This 
may imply that a certificate programme does not equip workers with any skills that 











Table 5. Augmented Mincerian earnings function for private and public sectors. 
Dependent variable: lnwage 
Variable Private Public Total 
Constant 4.345346*** 4.548553* 4.465008 *** 
(0.1064473) (0.0746449) (0.0603618) 
Elementary 0.0647674*** 0.1081993*** 0.086525*** 
(0.0143128) (0.0107161) (0.00853707) 
Junior 0.1174847** 0.0728196* 0.0890034*** 
(0.0467104) (0.0353787) (0.0290506) 
Secondary 0.1310741 *** 0.0897682* 0.1141493*** 
(0.0246581) (0.0173391 ) (0.0143034) 
University incomplete 0.2439472*** 0.0863697*** 0.1269287*** 
(0.0875529) (0.0394754) (0.03869450 
University certificate -0.2109776 -0.0181123 -0.0462724 
(0.1504545) (0.0439935) (0.0452419) 
Vocational/University diploma 0.7207881 0.2648255*** 0.3215922*** 
(0.5201637) (0.1077761) (0.11981730 
Bachelors degree 0.3713923 0.2892931 * 0.253016*** 
(0.3255098) (0.0836846) (0.0913170 
Postgraduate 0.3704822 0.0581629 0.1030048 
(0.7614307) (0.1984536) (0.22103390 
Experience 0.04988628** 0.0244956* 0.0363285*** 
(0.0057909) (0.0034197) (0.0030199) 
Experience square -0.0005083*** -0.0001484* -0.0003126 *** 
(0.0000955) (0.0000549) (0.00004930 
Asmarino 0.1680585*** 0.1245668* 0.1264625 *** 
(0.0591509) (0.0340698) (0.0302668) 
EPLF 0.4016404*** 0.7036333* 0.6176762*** 
(0.0874952) (0.0380137) (0.35311471) 
Inverse Mills -0.655501 * -0.4945951 * -0.4507564*** 
(0.0522242) (0.0103762) (0.0472414) 
Log likelihood -857.1678 -987.1789 -1781.285 
? 1259.17 1476.66 X- 374.98 
N 789 1114 1948 
***Significant at 1 % level. **Significant at 5%. *Significant at 10%. 
Values in parentheses are standard errors 
the University of Asmara offers certificate programmes tailored for government 
employees, mainly ex-fighters, to justify their positions. That is, whether they get the 
certificate or not does not affect their earnings, except for providing them with 
credentials, which can help them to retain their position. 
With regard to the rate of return to university/ vocational diplomas and 
bachelor degrees, they are found to be positive and significant only in the public 











bachelors degree holders in the private sector are found to be statistically 
insignificant. This, too, is not surprising though. It may be explained by the small 
number vocational/university diploma and bachelor degree holders employed in the 
private sector. The majority of graduates are employed by the government. 
Government employs 80% of the people with post-secondary education, whereas the 
private sector and the field of self-employment are more important for unskilled 
people, employing about 50% of those with no formal education (Arneberg and 
Pedersen, 2001). However, according to their report, wage rates for highly skilled 
personnel in the private sector were higher than those paid by the government. The 
report does not identify the specific skills though. 
The coefficient of the EPLF dummy is found to be positive and significant in 
both cases. The coefficient of EPLF is substantially higher in the public sector than in 
the private sector. This is in line with expectations. In the public sector, party 
premium is 52.21 % higher than in the private sector. This is in line with the fact that 
the government can influence wage determination in the public sector by giving high 
wages according to the pre-independence history of an employee. 
With regard to experience, Table 5 shows that the effect of experience on 
earnings is higher in the private sector than in the public sector. The coefficient of 
experience is about 0.50 in the private sector and 0.02 in the public sector. This may 
be explained by the relative competitiveness of demand for experienced workers in 
the private sector. Private sector workers get higher wages as their experience 
increases, and as they master their job and increase their productivity. If employers 
fail to pay higher wages with an increase in experience workers may change jobs. 
Employers thus have to pay higher wages for experience to retain experienced 
workers. A high wage or an increase in wages encourages that person to stay with the 
company for a longer period. The assumption is that not only is there an increase in 
productivity, but also in the loyalty and obedience of workers. Those who are self-
employed may also benefit from experience via an increase in productivity. By 











was designed in 1994,32 except for that of ex-fighters. During the retrenchment 
programme of the government the number of years that workers had worked for the 
previous Ethiopian regimes were not counted as experience in wage determination. 
Moreover, since there is relative security of employment in the public sector, workers 
are generally willing to accept lower rewards for their experience. Consequently, it is 
not surprising that the rate of return from experience is higher in the private sector 
than in the public sector. 
5.2.2 Earnings Variation by Gender 
As discussed in Section 5.1, the influence of years of schooling and experience on 
earnings is different for males and females. In this section we replicate the procedure 
but now incorporate the extended Mincerian earnings function. Without resorting to 
the complexities of estimating discrimination, we estimate separate equations for both 
sexes to gain a sense of any gender differential in the determination of earnings. The 
accurate measurement of discrimination of course needs a separate treatment, as it is 
controversial and as it raises the common problems of measurement error. 
Table 6 reports extended Mincerian earnings functions for males and females 
separately. This procedure was followed in order to investigate possible differences 
in the determination of earnings between sexes. In other words we checked whether 
the relationship between earnings and the independent variables in our model were 
uniform or not across the sexes. According to Table 6, the rates of return to education 
were indeed substantially different for males and females. The private rates of return 
from elementary, middle and secondary education are higher for females than males. 
While the rate of return for females who completed primary school is about 
7.7%, it is 4.2% for males. The rate of return to middle education is about 13% for 
females, whereas as the rate of return to education for males is only 46% of that of 
females. The rate of return from secondary education is about 13.5% for females, 
whereas that for males is only 9.8%. However, the rates of return to university 
diploma and bachelors degree for females are statistically insignificant, whereas for 
males they are positive and significant. This may, however, be partially attributed to 
32 There was a retrenchment of public sector employers in 1994 for the purpose of creating a more 











the sample size, i.e. the number of female vocational or university graduates was very 
small. 
Table 6. Augmented Mincerian earnings function by gender. Dependent variable: 
lnwage33 
Female Male 
Constant 4.410008*** 4.752795*** 
(0,09l3763) (0.0779972) 
Elementary 0.0769576*** 0,0423625*** 
(0.01199660) (0.0116039) 
Middle 0.129557*** 0.060126*** 
(0.0420993) (0,0358129) 
Secondary 0, l350554*** 0.0983895*** 
(0.02153650 (0.0173849) 
University incomplete 0.1919295** 0.0953742** 
(0.0752112) (0.0434948) 
University certificate -0.0804505 -0.0198757 
(0.0805971) (O.0532624 ) 
VocationallUniversity diploma 0.191263 0.3664549** 
(0.1585) (0.1537841 ) 
Bachelors degree 0.2587287 0.2146431** 
(0.1708332) (0.1064691) 
Post graduate 0.01031458 0.1051458 
0,2345378 0.2263378 
Experience 0.0359324 0.0402868 
(0.005487) (0.003577) 
Experience square 0.000402*** -0.0004701 *** 
(0.0001024) (0.000058) 
Asmarino -0.0163201 0.2841291*** 
(0.0454264) (0.0386106) 
EPLF 0.8895834*** 0.4708481 *** 
(0.0567918) (0.0386106) 
Inverse Mill's Ratio -0.3715174 -0.4659583 
(0.0736089) 0.0632922 
Log Likelihood -452.9735 -1748.2252 
1194.36 
1290 
11',""1\,.«11< at 1 %. **Significant at 5%, values errors 
When we look at the other variables, however, the above trend is reversed. 
The rate of return to experience is marginally higher for males than for females in 
linear terms. Moreover the coefficient of the regional dummy Asmarino is positive 
and significant only in the male equation. Its interpretation, following Halvorsen and 












Palmquist (1980), is that males who are from the capital city Asmara earn 32.9% 
more than males from the other regions, all other things remaining constant, whereas 
for females the results suggest that there is no regional income differential. Finally, 
Table 6 shows that the rate of return for EPLF party membership is higher for females 
than for males. Following Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980), the mean earnings of ex-
fighter females are 143% higher than non-ex-fighter female, all other things 
remaining constant. Using the same technique, the coefficient of the EPLF dummy in 
the male equation can be interpreted as follows: the mean earnings of ex-fighter males 
are 60%higher than male non-ex-fighters, all other things remaining constane4. This 
may be explained by the affirmative actions pursued to ensure the political 
representation of females in many postS.35 
5.2.3 Earnings Variation by Occupation 
Work activities have remarkable differences in their pecuniary and non-pecumary 
nature. Specific working conditions differ from one occupation to another, for 
example the elements of risk, safety and other working conditions. Hence, to equalize 
for these differences, employers pay different wage rates to compensate for the 
relative disutility of any occupation. In most cases, there are also personal preferences 
and perceptions towards many occupations. Adam Smith in his famous book The 
Wealth of Nations argues that wages paid should equalize the differences in amenities 
and disamenities (1947). For example, when there are two jobs, which differ in their 
non-monetary disamenities, the wage paid should compensate for the difference. Of 
course there is also a demand and supply interaction in the final analysis. Smith states 
his argument as follows: 
"The whole of advantages and disadvantages of different employment of labour and stock 
must, in the same neighborhood, be either perfectly equal or continually tending to equality. 
If in the same neighborhood there was any employment evidently either more or less 
advantageous than the rest, so many people would crowd into it in one case, and so many 
would desert it in the other, that its advantages would soon return to the level of other 
employments" [Adam Smith, 1947: Chapter one, Book I] 
The idea of equalizing differential is a long-run concept, though. In the 
end, the demand and supply of labour after adjustments to the pecuniary and non-
pecuniary costs and benefits will adjust accordingly to set the wage rate. People 
will ultimately respond to the long-term benefits and costs of different 
34 This may also mean greater gender earnings differential among non ex-fighters. 











occupations. This concept of equalizing differentials is often used as a 
justification for the analysis of occupational earnings differentials36. A decision 
whether to supply labour or not is a function of the wage vis-it-vis the utilities and 
disutilities of the job in question. Given a high-risk element, the supplier of such 
labour would expect a higher reward. Hall (1970) notes that some workers are 
willing to trade off insecurity in employment for higher wages during their term 
of employment. This paper also finds that the private sector pays more than the 
government sector, taking into account the security of employment among others. 
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***Significant at 1 % degree of significance. N=number of observations 





































* * Significant at 5% degree of significance. All the occupational dummies are jointly significant at 1% 
level. 
The idea of equalizing differentials has strong empirical practicability and 
can be employed to explain occupational earnings differentials. This section 
explores the occupational earnings differential in Eritrea. The occupations are 
classified into 11 groups, namely: professional and technicians, administrative 
and managerial, government and executive officer, clerical work, sales worker, 
service worker, military, agriculture/fishery, production related, transport 
equipment operator, and daily labourers. Table 7 reports the expanded earnings 
function by including dummies for each occupational group. 
Table 7 clearly shows that the introduction of occupational dummies to the 
expanded earnings function reduces the size of all coefficients. This may be an 
indication that the model was suffering from an omission of variables bias. The 
exclusion of occupation dummies overstated the parameters of education and 
other variables in the model. Of the 11 occupations only four of them turned out 
to be significant. These occupational groups are: professional and technical, 
administrative and managerial, clerical work, service worker and military. The 
interpretation of the coefficients follows Halvorsen and Palmquist's technique of 
conversion. The interpretation of the coefficient of military occupation is that 
earnings of soldiers are on the average 98.9% higher than those of daily labourer, 
keeping all other things constant. The coefficients for other occupational groups 
can be interpreted likewise. The highest premium for military workers (soldiers) 
may be explained as a reward for the high risk involved. This tends to agree with 
the principle of equalizing differentials. What is most striking is that the 
coefficient for service workers is negative and significant. This may be explained 
by the fact that most workers in the service sector are rewarded neither in wages 
nor in terms of their working conditions. Moreover, most of the jobs under this 
occupation demand unskilled labour, which is relatively abundant in Eritrea. This 












The most common economic theory in wage detennination is human capital theory. 
The first issue in any empirical findings regarding the relationship between earnings 
and schooling is the methodology of estimation, which takes into account the nature 
of the data. This paper finds that OLS and tobit estimation results are not significantly 
different. That is, there is no incidental truncation. However, it was found that there is 
sample selection bias. The Heckman two-stage estimation technique was found to be 
the most appropriate econometric method because it avoids the selectivity bias. 
Overall the rate of return to education increases as years of education 
increases. The average rate of return to education was found to be 9.3 percent. 
Females have a higher rate of return to education than males. These results are in line 
with many findings and are attributed to the lower foregone earnings of females 
compared with their male counterparts. The higher private rate of return to education 
may also explain the relative scarcity of education. 
In tenns of the profitability of education, the highest rate of return is found for 
technical school or university diploma, which suggests that investments in technical 
schools and colleges are the most profitable areas for an individual. The next highest 
rate of return is found to be for people with a university degree, followed by 
secondary, middle and elementary school respectively. The coefficient for 
postgraduate education was found to be statistically insignificant. Of course, all these 
conclusions may be a little slanted, given the nature of the sample 
The rate of return to education differs substantially between private and public 
sector employment. The private rate of return from primary education is higher in the 
public sector than in the private sector. However, with regard to secondary school 
education, the rate of return is higher in the private sector than in the public sector. 
The rate of return from a university or vocational diploma and the rate of return from 











Ex-fighters do enjoy some special wage premium, indicating the importance of 
their pre-independence history. In fact, there seems to be discrimination against non-
ex-fighters in the labour market. Although the higher mean wage can be partially 
attributed to the fact that ex-fighters have a marginally higher level of education, the 
results can mainly be explained by a political decision. The EPLF party premium is 
higher in the public sector than in the private sector. Moreover, surprisingly the party 
premium is higher for females than for males. 
The effect of experience is found to be positive and significant in linear terms. 
Experience squared was introduced and it is found to be significant and negative. 
There is a peak level of experience, at which experience affects earnings positiVely. 
Experience also adds positively to earnings until the age of 52. Moreover, the effect of 
experience on earnings is higher in the private sector than in the public sector. 
Occupational choice is one of the determinants of earnings in Eritrea. 
However, not all occupational groups affect earnings significantly. The 
occupational groups, which were found to be statistically significant, are: 
professional and technical, administrative and managerial, clerical work, service 
worker and military. Military workers, soldiers, earn the highest premmm, 
followed by administrative and managerial, professional and technical, 
respectively. 
Policy Implications 
A positive and significant association between earnings and higher level of technical 
training implies the urgent need for such institutions that can train individuals along 
modem lines in order to cope with rapidly changing technology. Three or more years 
of training would seem to play an important role in the labour market; there is 
therefore a dire need to keep workers up to date about the technological advancements 
through high quality technical training. 
With regard to the investment in university education, the results support the 











its programmes and emphasis on a market-oriented approach. The market-oriented 
approach should be introduced at the school level. This may imply the overhauling of 
the school system not only in the curriculum but also in its teaching methods. 
The coefficient of postgraduate schooling is statistically insignificant. 
Although this may be explained by the small sample observations for postgraduates, 
its implication is not simple. The findings from this paper do not support the ongoing 
Eritrean Human Resources Development (EHRD). There is a need for proper 
evaluation of the rate of return for this investment. This study could be a starting point 
for such practice. Of course, there may also be some non-wage benefits to the society 
from the project, for instance institution building. Moreover, this study is limited in 
the sense that it does not include the costs associated with each educational level. It is 
worth remembering that the estimated coefficients are rough estimates of the private 
rate of return to education that could be found in cost benefit analysis, whereas for 
policymaking we need to look more at the social rate of return. 
A positive party premium for ex-fighters could skew incentives. Even though 
it is true that ex-fighters lost productive time in the liberation struggle and hence may 
not compete using their skills in the labour market, other means of compensation 
should be designed. For instance, some kind of training could be organized or a basic 
income grant could be arranged for ex-fighters. In this way the government could 
minimize the disincentive effect for education by rewarding schooling rather than 
party membership. If individuals are not rewarded for their private investment in 
human capital, the demand for education may decline and the country would continue 
to suffer from a shortage of skilled manpower. A competition-based wage-setting 
mechanism would encourage more investment in education and thereby stimulate 
innovation. At present, the government cannot be both efficient and effective because 
it is in a sense subsidising its workers. 
The last policy implication is that there is a need for further in-depth studies 
with regard to investment in education, regional income inequalities and gender 
earnings differentials. The preliminary results contained in this paper could be a base 
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